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Recalling First Principles: The
Importance of Comity in Avoiding
Antitrust Imperialism
J. Frank Hogue∗
In his bestselling book The World Is Flat, Pulitzer
Prize-winning journalist Thomas Friedman provides everyday
examples of how globalization has re-shaped the commercial
world over the course of the last two decades. 1 While Friedman’s
thesis is much larger than just the effect of globalization on
commerce and the changes we have witnessed in the yet-young
twenty-first century world, he devotes significant space to how
foreign countries have helped shape the newly-flat world. 2 In
particular, he examines how their companies have dramatically
reorganized global supply chains and have become indispensable
players in the modern commercial landscape. 3 Friedman recounts
his experience in 2004 of ordering a notebook computer and the
variety of countries and companies that he is linked to in this
transaction. 4 He traces the supply chain that created his
∗ J. Frank Hogue is a senior associate in White & Case’s Global
Competition Group. He is a litigator whose work focuses on defending major
international corporations against allegations that they violated U.S. antitrust
and competition laws. He has represented companies in various U.S. federal
courts, before the DOJ, FTC, SEC, and state antitrust enforcement agencies as
well as in matters involving competition authorities in various foreign
jurisdictions. This article is written in his personal capacity and the views
expressed herein are his own.
1. See generally THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT 3.0: A BRIEF
HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007).
2. See id. at 127–66 (describing foreign countries’ contributions to the
world’s “flattening” process).
3. See id. at 151–66 (discussing how foreign companies have influenced
supply chains).
4. See id. at 580–85 (“Before I share with you the subject of this chapter, I
have to tell you a little bit about the computer that I wrote this book
on . . . . This book was largely written on a Dell Inspirion 600m notebook,
service tag number 9ZRJP41.”).
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computer and identifies the various companies and countries that
supplied components of his new computer. 5
Friedman writes that “the total supply chain for my
computer, including suppliers of suppliers, involved about four
hundred companies in North America, Europe and primarily
Asia, but with thirty key players.” 6 The part-by-part breakdown
dramatically shows the extent to which foreign countries
increasingly supply the building blocks of electronics sold far
from their own shores. 7
Friedman highlights the complexity of Dell’s supply chain
and the diversity of component suppliers to make a geopolitical
point. 8 An outbreak of armed conflict in East or Southeast Asia
would “seriously unflatten” global commerce. 9 Friedman
observes:
[A]s the world flattens, one of the most interesting dramas to
watch in international relations will be the interplay between
the traditional global threats and the newly emergent global
supply chains. The interaction between old-time threats (like
China versus Taiwan) and just-in-time supply chains (like
China plus Taiwan) will be a rich source of study for the field
of international relations in the early twenty-first century. 10

5. See id. at 580–85 (listing component manufacturers for each step in the
supply chain).
6. Id. at 585.
7. See id. at 582–83 (identifying the Philippines, Costa Rica, Malaysia,
China, Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, Ireland, India, and Israel as the locations of key suppliers who
possibly supplied components for his notebook computer).
8. See id. at 585 (using the notebook computer story “to tell a larger story
of geopolitics in the flat world” and indicating that “an outbreak of a good,
old-fashioned, world-shaking, economy-destroying war” threatens to hold back
or even reverse the flattening process).
9. See id.
It could be China deciding once and for all to eliminate Taiwan as an
independent state; or North Korea, out of fear or insanity, using one
of its nuclear weapons against South Korea or Japan; or Israel and
soon-to-be-nuclear Iran going at each other; or India and Pakistan
finally nuking it out. These and other classic geopolitical conflicts
could erupt at any time and either slow the flattening of the world or
seriously unflatten it.
10. Id. at 586.
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I would add a somewhat less apocalyptic source of conflict
that may hamper the operation of global commerce: the
overzealous extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. Each of
the countries that supplied a part of Mr. Friedman’s computer
have their own laws and regulations that govern the conduct of
companies doing business within their borders, among them
competition laws that delineate what is and what is not
permissible. 11 These regulations reflect the legal and commercial
traditions unique to particular jurisdictions, and embody the
differing choices made by these states. And, of course, the United
States has its own innumerable laws that govern the conduct of
commerce within its own borders. 12 These are the product of the
U.S. and Western commercial heritage. As to all of the countries,
it has long been established in international law that principles
of sovereignty permit these nations to apply their laws to conduct
occurring within their territory. 13 But conflict and friction in the
international commercial system can occur when one nation
seeks to apply its own laws to conduct that takes place within the
borders of another nation. 14 The extraterritorial application of
11. See Scott D. Hammond, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address at the 56th Annual Spring Meeting of the ABA
Section of Antitrust Law: Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the
Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program 18 (Mar. 26, 2008),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.pdf (“Seemingly with each
passing day, the antitrust community learns of a foreign government that has
enacted a new antitrust law, created a new cartel investigative unit, obtained a
record antitrust fine, or adopted a new corporate leniency program.”); Andreas
Mundt, Chair, Int’l Competition Network, Focus, Inclusiveness and
Implementation—The ICN as a Key Factor for Global Convergence in
Competition Law 2 (Sept. 5, 2013), http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/
uploads/library/doc924.pdf (explaining that the International Competition
Network is comprised of 126 agency members from 111 different jurisdictions).
12. See, e.g., Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (making illegal every
contract, combination, or conspiracy “in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations”); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (2012)
(prohibiting anticompetitive conduct).
13. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 297
(6th ed. 2003) (“The starting-point in this part of the law is the proposition that,
at least as a presumption, jurisdiction is territorial.”).
14. See Brief for Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan as
Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees 3, Motorola Mobility LLC v. AU Optronics
Corp., 775 F.3d 816 (7th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-8003) (“‘[E]xcessive’ extraterritorial
application of competition law tends to bring about serious tension between the
countries involved.”); Brief for Belgian Competition Authority as Amicus Curiae
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antitrust regulations is a potent example. Conflict is particularly
possible when it is American antitrust law that is urged to reach
foreign commerce and conduct. 15 While such an application can
be permissible in certain circumstances, there are constraints on
the extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws to
alleviate such friction. 16 One such constraint, but certainly not
the only one, is the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act
(FTAIA). 17
While the FTAIA initially enjoyed little celebrity, it has
taken on an increased importance in debates over how far and to
what conduct American courts should extend the reach of
American antitrust law. 18 Increasingly, American courts have
taken up the proper application of FTAIA to cases involving

Supporting Appellee 6, Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d 816 (No. 14-8003) (“The
proliferation of competition law systems can contribute significantly to a better
functioning of markets. But without the necessary convergence and comity,
conflicting policies may well become a significant obstacle to trade and
investment, as recognized by nations across the globe.”).
15. See F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004) (“No one denies that America’s antitrust laws, when applied to foreign
conduct, can interfere with a foreign nation’s ability independently to regulate
its own commercial affairs.”); Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 824 (stating that
increasing “the global reach of the Sherman Act” would “creat[e] friction with
many foreign countries”).
16. See Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 824 (emphasizing that the United
States is not “the world’s competition police officer”).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2012)
Sections 1 to 7 of this title [the Sherman Act] shall not apply to
conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or
import commerce) with foreign nations unless—
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect—
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with
foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with
foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of
a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the [Sherman Act].
18. See United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir.
2004) (“Federal courts did not shower the FTAIA with attention for the first
decade after its enactment.”), abrogated on other grounds by United States v.
Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2014).
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foreign conduct, foreign commerce, and domestic claims. 19 So too
has academia, producing a remarkable volume of scholarly
research and shining much-needed light on a once-obscure
statute. 20
It is into this already-crowded field that Ms. Leonard bravely
enters with her timely Note, In Need of Direction: An Evaluation
of the “Direct Effect” Requirement Under the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act. 21 In her Note, Ms. Leonard seeks to
identify the appropriate test to allow the FTAIA to play its proper
role in the modern global economy. 22 Ms. Leonard focuses her
analysis on a single aspect of the analysis with which courts
engage when applying the FTAIA, namely the direct effect
prong. 23 She skillfully dissects and analyzes two differing tests
that courts have used in evaluating whether there is a sufficient
link between foreign conduct and an alleged harm to domestic
19. See, e.g., Motorola Mobility, 775 F.3d at 818–20 (considering the
FTAIA’s application to foreign conduct); Lotes Co. v. Hon Hai Precision Indus.
Co., 753 F.3d 395, 409–15 (2d Cir. 2014) (deciding whether defendant’s foreign
anticompetitive conduct gave rise to plaintiff’s antitrust claim); Minn-Chem,
Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845, 856–60 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (analyzing
whether the FTAIA applied to a foreign potash cartel); Animal Sci. Prods., Inc.
v. China Minmetals Corp., 654 F.3d 462, 470–72 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing the
FTAIA’s text as it applies to the foreign defendant’s foreign conduct); United
Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942, 952–53 (7th Cir. 2003) (en
banc) (discussing whether the FTAIA applied to foreign behavior), overruled on
other grounds by Minn-Chem, 683 F.3d 845 (overruling United Phosphorus’s
holding that the FTAIA’s requirements are jurisdictional in nature).
20. See generally Max Huffman, A Retrospective on Twenty-Five Years of
the Foreign Antitrust Improvements Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 285 (2007); Robert D.
Sowell, New Decisions Highlight Old Misgivings: A Reassessment of the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act Following Minn-Chem, 66 FLA. L. REV. 511
(2014); Joseph P. Bauer, The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act: Do We
Really Want to Return to American Banana?, 65 ME. L. REV. 3 (2012); Ryan A.
Haas, Act Locally, Apply Globally: Protecting Consumers from International
Cartels by Applying Domestic Antitrust Law Globally, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
99 (2003).
21. Claire L. Leonard, In Need of Direction: An Evaluation of the “Direct
Effect” Requirement Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 73
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 489 (2016).
22. See id. at 493–96 (considering the question of when American antitrust
law applies to purely foreign anticompetitive conduct).
23. See id. at 492 (“In a globalized economy, the precise meaning of direct
becomes even more elusive—and more significant—in the face of complex
corporate structures and elaborate supply chains that span numerous
countries.”).
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American commerce. 24 And while Ms. Leonard’s analysis is sound
and her ultimate conclusion well-supported, fundamental
principles of comity—a first principle when discussing foreign
application of a nation’s law—plays only a supporting role in her
Note. 25
But notions of international comity must not be relegated to
such a secondary position. Courts, including the U.S. Supreme
Court, have recognized that comity concerns play a prime role as
a first principle in determining whether to extend the antitrust
laws to foreign conduct. 26 Because, as the Court observed, “Why
should American law supplant, for example, Canada’s or Great
Britain’s or Japan’s own determination about how best to protect
Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive
conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or
Japanese or other foreign companies?” 27
As other countries have urged, “Greater comity is required in
our modern era when international transactions involve a
constant flow of products, wealth and people across the globe.” 28
Greater comity leaves other countries free to organize their
economies and develop their own domestic industries in
24. See id. at 507–15 (analyzing the two diverging tests for a “direct effect”
in the FTAIA: (1) the immediate consequence test and (2) the reasonably
proximate causal nexus test).
25. See id. at 527–31 (devoting only a short section to discussing comity
concerns).
26. See F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163–
65 (2004)
[T]his Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other
nations . . . . This rule of construction reflects principles of customary
international law—law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily
seeks to follow. . . . This rule of statutory construction cautions courts
to assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign
interests of other nations when they write American laws. It thereby
helps the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work
together in harmony—a harmony particularly needed in today’s
highly interdependent commercial world.
(citations omitted).
27. Id. at 165.
28. Brief for the Government of Canada as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Reversal at 7, F. Hoffman–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL
226389 (quoting Hunt v. T&N plc, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 289, 322 (Can.)).
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accordance with the wishes of their own people. 29 As the
government of Japan has put it, Japan “has significant economic,
political, and legal interests in ensuring that companies based in
Japan shall comply with the Japanese legal system, and that
Japanese companies running businesses elsewhere shall comply
with ‘reasonable’ jurisdictional requirements of other nations.” 30
The United Kingdom, Ireland, and the Netherlands cited the U.S.
Supreme Court to renowned scholar Vaughan Lowe in making
the point that a faithful adherence to notions of international
comity preserve to each country the ability to conduct its
domestic affairs in accordance with that nation’s own norms and
priorities. 31 An overzealous extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws, and failure to heed comity concerns, risks
“fail[ing] to give proper consideration to the legitimate choices
those nations have made concerning the regulation of their own
commerce and competition in their own industries.” 32
Returning to Mr. Friedman’s computer, each of the fifteen
countries at issue in the supply chain has elected to regulate its
company’s activities in accordance with the social and political
considerations unique to its respective nation. 33 A review of the
list of countries reveals a number of societies that are climbing
the ladder from second-world status to become important
29. See id. at 165 (acknowledging that applying American law “creates a
serious risk of interference with a foreign nation’s ability independently to
regulate its own commercial affairs”).
30. Brief for the Government of Japan as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioners at 1, F. Hoffman–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2004 WL
226390, at *1.
31. See Brief for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, Ireland and the Kingdom of the Netherlands as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 18, F. Hoffman–La Roche, 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724),
2004 WL 226597, at *18 (citing Lowe’s observation that “[t]he legal rules and
principles governing jurisdiction have a fundamental importance in
international relations, because they are concerned with the allocation between
States . . . of competence to regulate daily life—that is, the competence to secure
the differences that make each State a distinct society” (quoting Vaughan Lowe,
Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 329, 330 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2003))).
32. Brief for the Federal Republic of Germany as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v.
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (No. 03-724), 2003 WL 22896686, at *7.
33. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing countries in the supply
chain).
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exporters and links in the global supply chain. 34 Courts in the
United States should recognize and take heed of the different
commercial decisions these foreign countries and their citizens
have made and keep in mind comity considerations when
interpreting the FTAIA when judging claimed violations of the
antitrust laws.
Ms. Leonard demonstrates admirable courage and skill in
delving into the technical nuances of the notoriously difficult
FTAIA. I believe that the body of academic literature is richer
with the contributions of her Note. I hope that she continues
what she has begun and turns her future efforts to those
fundamental principles that provide the foundation for the
extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws.

34. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (listing countries in the supply
chain).

